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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S·TATE OF UTAH 
D.A.V. CHAPTER NO. 6; AMERICAN 
LEGION POST 60; THE KENT CLUB; 
THE M. & B. CLUB, INC.; D.A.V. 
CHAPTER NO. 11; CLUB LAUREE, 
all non-profit corporations, 
P lainti If s, 
-vs.-
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH; LA1fONT F. 
TORONTO, duly elected official to the 
above office, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 8341 
We adopt the plaintiffs Statement of Facts and 
concede that they are substantiapy correct. 
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STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE STATES OF THE UNION, UNDER THE TWENTY-
FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES, HAVE EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER 
THE SALE, TRANSPORTATION, CONSUMPTION, STOR-
AGE, ETC., OF ALCOHOLI·C BEVERAGES. 
POINT II 
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND 
IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 23 OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
POINT III 
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS BE-
ING IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 24, AND 
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26, SUBDIVISION 16, OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF UTAH OR OF SECTION 1 OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES. 
POINT IV 
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT INVALID UNDER THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT, SECTION 1, OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES, SINCE. IT IS NOT UN-
CERTAIN, AMBIGUOUS OR INCAPABLE OF ENFORCE-
MENT. 
POINT V 
HOUSE BILL 16 IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER AR-
TICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH AND IS NOT AN INVALID DELEGATION OF A 
JUDICIAL FUNCTION. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
POINT VI 
HOUSE BILL 16 DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTI·CLE I, 
SECTION 18, UTAH ·CONSTITUTION, IN THAT IT DOES 
NOT IMP AIR THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. 
POINT VII 
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT CONTRARY TO ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 9, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, IN THAT IT DOES 
NOT PROVIDE FOR AN EX·CESSIVE AND UNREASON-
ABLE FINE UPON A LIMITED GROUP. 
ARGU11ENT 
POINT I 
THE STATES OF THE UNION, UNDER THE TWENTY-
FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES, HAVE EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER 
THE SALE, TRANSPORTATION, CONSUMPTION, STOR-
AGE, ETC., OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES. 
House Bill 16 is a legislative measure, the purpose 
of which is to regulate and control certain nonprofit 
corporations of the State of Utah. In addition to regulat-
ing and controlling these particular corporations, the 
bill confers upon them special privileges which no other 
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4 
corporation or legal entity is granted. Why is this par-
ticular type or kind of corporation so regulated and con-
trolled and at the smne time granted special privileges T 
An examination of House Bill 16 discloses the answer 
to this question. Any social club, recreational or athleti~ 
association incorporated as a nonprofit organization, 
which "maintains or intends to maintain premises upon 
which liquor is or will be stored or consumed'' and only 
these particular nonprofit corporations are subject to 
regulation and control and are the recipients of the 
granted privileges set forth in this bill. Thus, nonprofit 
corporations are further subdivided into a more limited 
classification consisting only of those upon whose prem-
ises liquor is to be stored or consumed. This classifica-
tion is neither ambiguous nor unreasonahle. 
It is assumed much of the time that a corporation 
cannot be restrained nor controlled within the limits of 
the law. However, a corporation is a creature of the 
state and exists solely by sufferance of the state. A 
corporation has no privilege or right, except as deter-
mined by the sovereign creating it, or permitting its 
creation and existence. The courts throughout the states 
support this first point overwhelmingly. See Keetch v. 
Cordner (1936), 90 Utah 423,62 P. 273. 
The case of Keetch v. Cordner, supra, is consistent 
with Article XII, Section 1 of the Constitution of the 
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State of Vtah which reads as follows: 
"Corporations may be formed under general 
laws, but shall not be created by special acts. All 
laws relating to corporations may be altered, 
amended or repealed by the Legislature, and all 
corporations doing business in this state may, as 
to such business, be regulated, limited or re-
strained by the law." 
Plaintiffs complain that they are to be required to 
procure and file a bond, file their constitutions and by-
laws, membership lists and leases, to limit the number 
of members consistent with the purpose and nature of 
the club, to establish reasonable dues and initiation fees 
consistent with the nature and purpose of the club or 
association, to establish reasonable regulations for the 
dropping of members for nonpayment of dues, to estab-
lish strict regulations for the government of club rooms 
and quarters consistent with the nature and character 
of the club. BUT plaintiffs are only required to do these 
things if they now maintain or intend to maintain prem-
ises upon which liquor is or will be stored or consumed. 
And, if plaintiffs meet the requirements enumerated in 
House Bill 16, they (such nonprofjt corporations) are 
given and granted the exclusive right to operate the 
so-called "locker system" for the storage and serving 
of intoxicating liquors and may also hold a federal retail 
malt revenue stamp. 
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6 
Thus, the State of Utah has chosen nonprofit cor-
porations as the only entity or organization which is to 
be permitted to allow the storage, consumption and serv-
ing of liquors pursuant to the so-called "locker system." 
Does the imposition of the foregoing requirements 
and the granting of this exclusive privilege deny or of-
fend any of plaintiffs' legal or constitutional rights Y We 
believe not and shall cite court decisions to prove our 
position. 
Prior to the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, state authority over the liquor 
business was virtually supreme and state legislatures 
could regulate the liquor business to any extent they 
desired, including total prohibition. In Crane v. Camp-
bell (1917), 245 U.S. 304, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the constitutionality of an Idaho statute making it un-
lawful to possess intoxicating liquor for personal use, 
That court stated: 
"It must now be regarded as settled that, 
on account of their well-known noxious qualities 
and the extraordinary evils shown by experience 
commonly to be consequent upon their use, a state 
has power absolutely to prohibit manufacture, 
gift, purchase, sale, or transportation of intoxicat-
ing liquors within its borders without violating 
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 \Vall. 129; Beer Company 
v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33; Mugler v. Kan-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
sas, 123 V.S. 623, 662; Crowley v. Christensen, 
137 U.S. 86, 91; Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 
U.S. 192, 201; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western 
Jll!aryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 320, 321; Sea-
bard Air Line Ry. v. North Carolina, ante, 298. 
"As the state has the power above indicated 
to prohibit, it may adopt such measures as are 
reasonably appropriate or needful to render 
exercise of that power effective. * * * " 
The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the manu-
facture, sale or transportation of "intoxicating liquors.'' 
The Twenty-first Amendment repealed the Eighteenth 
Amendment and provided in Section 2 as follows : 
"The transportation or importation into any 
State, Territory, or possession of the United 
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating 
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby 
prohibited." 
It is clear that the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment 
is to restore to the Federal Government and to the 
states the respective powers over the manufacture, sale, 
distribution, serving and storage, etc., of alcoholic 
beverages which they had prior to the Eighteenth 
Amendment, except to the extent that the area of state 
power is enlarged and that of federal power correspond-
ingly restricted by Section 2. 
In Carter v. Virginia, (1944) 321 U. S. 131, it was 
held that Virginia could validly require persons shipping 
intoxicants through Virginia to post bonds and present 
hills of lading showing thP route to be followed, the true 
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consignees and that such consignee~ have a legal right 
to receive the liquors at the point of destination. The 
majority opinion held that these regulatory provisions 
were within the state polire power without ever relying 
on the Twenty-first An1end1nent. In his concurring 
opinion in the Carter case, supra, Justice Black statrd: 
"I am not sure that state statutes regulating 
intoxicating liquor should ever be invalidated 
by this Court under the Com1nerce Clause except 
where they conflict with valid federal statutes. 
Cf. dissenting opinions, McCarroll v. Dixie Grey-
hound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 183; Gwin, White & 
Prince v. H enneford, 305 U.S. -t-34 442; Adams 
Manufact1tring Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316. 
The Twenty-first Amendment has placed liquor 
in a category different from that of other articles 
of commerce. Though the precise amount of 
power it has left in Congress to regulate liquor 
under the Com1nerce Clause has not been marked 
out by decisions, this much is settled; local, not 
national, regulation of the liquor traffic is now 
the general Constitutional policy. Ziffrin, Inc. 
v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132: Indianapolis Brewing Co. 
v. Liquor Control Comm'n., 305 U.S. 391; State 
Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 
299 u.s. 59." 
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States since the adoption of the Twenty-first Amend-
n1ent recognize that the regulatory power of the states 
over the importation of alcoholic beverages is free from 
limitation by the equal protection clause as well as by 
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9 
the commerce clam;;e of the Constitution. In Mahoney 
'l'- Joseph Triner Corp. (1938), 304 U.S. 401, it was 
urged that a local statute requiring registration in 
the United States Patent Office of brands of liquors as 
a condition precedent to their importation violated the 
equal protection clause, where no similar registration 
was required of brands locally produced. It was held 
that the equal protection clause is not now applicable 
to imported intoxicants. The same conclusion was 
reached in State Board of Equalization v. Youngs Mar-
ket Co. (1936), 299 F S. 59,62,63. 
In Utah illanufacturers Association v. Stewart, 23 
P. 2d 229, at 232, this Court said: 
"That the prohibition or regulation of the 
manufacture, transportation, sale, and use of 
alcohol and other intoxicating liquors is an exer-
cise of the police power of the state admits of no 
doubt. 33 C .• J. 505; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 
623, 8 S. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205." 
" * • • From the status of alcohol as an 
intoxicant and as the hase of various kinds of 
intoxicating liquors and beverages, it is appa-
rent that its manufacture, sale, distribution, and 
use is subject to regulation and control within 
the inherent police power of the state, and the 
legislature is competent to exercise this power to 
its full extent subject only to limitations or re-
strictions imposed by the state or United States 
Constitution." (Emphasis added.) 
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Thus, the State c,f Utah under the police power may 
regulate the manufacture, sale, distribution and use of 
alcoholic beverages in the State of Utah. 
House Bill16 permits certain privileges with respect 
to the sale and use of alcoholic beverages, on condition 
that the law of the State of Utah not be broken and on 
certain other precedent conditions which qualifying non-
profit corporations must meet. 
The State of Utah need not bestow any corporation 
In Utah with any such privilege, unless it so desires, 
and may, under the cases, place whatsoever conditions 
on the acquiring of the privilege as the State chooses. 
POINT II 
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND 
I.S NOT IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 23 OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
Article VI, .Section 23, of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah reads as follows: 
"Except general appropriation bills, and bills· 
for the codification and general revision of laws, 
no bill shall be passed containing more than one 
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its 
title." 
Plaintiffs raise constitutional objections to House 
Bill 16 on the grounds that it contains more than one 
subject in the title and in the body thereof. Plaintiffs 
argument is apparently based upon the fact that the 
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bill regulates and controls nonprofit clubs and also makes 
certain provisions with respect to the "locker system." 
However, plaintiffs completely overlook the fact that 
throughout the bill every provision is directly related 
to a nonprofit corporation. There is only one primary 
subject treated in this bill within the meaning of the 
limitation of Article VI, Section 23, of the Utah Constitu-
tion. That subject is "nonprofit corporations." The bill 
provides certain privileges for nonprofit corporations 
which meet all the requirements imposed upon such cor-
porations. The Legislature selected "nonprofit corpora-
tions," creatures of statutory law, and designated them 
as the only entity upon which the State of Utah would 
confer the privilege of operating a "locker system." As 
a condition to the privilege of operating the locker sys-
tem, certain obligations were imposed. 
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) \"" ol. 
1, at pages 295-297 discuss the purpose of constitutional 
provisions similar to Article VI, Section 23, of our Utah 
Constitution. We quote in part: 
"The general purpose of these provisions is 
accomplished when a law suit has but one general 
object, which is fairly indicated by its title. To re-
quire every e11d and means necessary or conven-
ient for the accon1plishment of this general object 
to be provided for by a separate act relating to 
that alone would not only be unreasonable, but 
would actually render legislation impossible." 
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12 
. This Court, in the case of Edler v. Edwards, 34 
Utah 13, 95 P. 367, announced the following general 
rules as guides in determining whether or not a given 
statute meets the requiren1ents of Article VI, Section 
23, of the Utah Constitution: 
" • • "" ( 1) That the constitutional provision 
now under consideration should be liberally con-
strued; (2) that the provision should be applied 
so as not to hamper the lawmaking power in fram-
ing and adopting comprehensive measures cover-
ing a whole subject, the branches of which may be 
numerous, but where all have some direct con-
nection with or relation to the principal subject 
treated; ( 3) that the constitutional provision 
should be so applied as to guard against the real 
evil which it was intended to meet; ( 4) that no 
hard and fast rule can be formulated which is 
applicable to all cases, but each must to a very 
large extent be determined in accordance with 
the peculiar circumstances and conditions there-
of, and that the decision of the courts are valu-
able merely as illustrations or guides in applying 
these general rules. Moveover, it is now estab-
lished beyond question that unless the invalidity 
of a particular law in question is clearly and 
manifestly established the law must prevail as 
against such an objection." 
Tested by these standards and rules, House Bill 16 
does not treat of rnore than one subject. Liquor locker 
clubs and the locker system are dealt with only as they 
are incidentally related to nonprofit corporations. 
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Plaintiffs contend that Section 32-7-3, U.C.A. 1953, 
is improperly amended by House Bill 16 and that the 
amendment injures and hurts plaintiffs in an uncon-
stitutional manner. Similarly, plaintiffs also contend 
that House Bill 16 is discriminatory and a violation of 
Article I, Section 24, Utah Constitution, in that it pur-
ports to repeal portions of Title 32, U.C.A. 1953, with 
relation to certain entities and not to others. Plaintiffs 
must show how and in what manner they are injured 
by virtue of this alleged condition, which they nowhere 
do. Without doing so, they are not entitled to raise the 
constitutional question. Even assuming plaintiffs' ability 
to show injury, their argument must f.ail Lecause they 
are dealing with privileges and not rights. See Utah 
Mfrs. Assoc. v. Stewart, supra. 
With respect to the manner in which Section 32-7-3, 
U.C.A. 1953 is amended by House Bill 16, it is pointed 
out that the amendment, if any, is strictly limited to 
nonprofit corporations, which are incidentally given the 
privilege of holding a federal retail malt liquor revenue 
stamp and at the same time they are permitted to allow 
members to store liquor on club premises. Prior to the 
passage of House Bill 16, Section 32-7-3, U.C.A. 1953 
prohibited anyone from storing or permitting others to 
store liquor on premises covered by federal retail malt 
revenue stamp. In a similar manner, the Utah Legisla-
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ture enacted a law creating the Weber County Irriga-
tion District, which law also incidentally amended other 
irrigation and water statutes. The act was challenged 
and this Court in State ex rel Cluff, Atty. Gen. v. Weber 
County Irrigation District, 218 P. 732, at 734, stated 
inter alia as follows : 
"Said chapter is, however, an entirely in-
dependent act, and no attempt is made therein 
to amend other sections of the statutes or other 
independent acts. True, it may be that some of 
the provisions of chapter 68 may in practice be 
found to affect or modify other provisions re-
lating to irrigation or water rights. That, how-
ever, is not what the Constitution forbids. Later 
laws are frequently enacted which in some way 
modify or affect earlier laws relating to the same 
subject-matter. That such is the effect of later 
enactments is inevitable, and in no way contra-
venes the constitutional provision that laws shall 
be amended only in a particular way. That pro-
vision has reference only to direct amendments, 
and not to conflirting provisions of separate and 
independent acts. See Edler v. Edwards, 34 Utah 
13, 95 Pac. 367, and cases there cited. See also 
Eden Irr. Co. v. District Court (Utah) 211 Pac. 
957." 
The ruling of this Court in this case answers in full the 
contentions of plaintiffs that the amendment of Sections 
32-7-3, and 32-1-8, U.C.A. 1953, is invalid. 
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POINT III 
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS BE-
ING IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 24, AND 
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26, SUBDIVISION 16, OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF UTAH OR OF SECTION 1 OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES. 
In the recent Utah Supreme Court decision involving 
the Entre Nous Club, a Utah Corporation v. Lamont F. 
Toronto, Sec. of State, Utah , 287 P 2d 670, 
the Court in holding that Article VI, Section 26, was not 
infringed upon by the Legislature when the nonprofit 
corporation statute was adopted, stated as follows: 
"Appellant further complains that the pro-
vision for revocation of the charter of a non-
profit corporation amounts to special legislation, 
prohibited by Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah 
Constitution. This court has considered the ques-
tion of reasonable classification innumerable 
times, consequently holding that if a reasonable 
basis to differentiate, those included from those 
excluded frorn the operation of the law can be 
found, it must be held constitutional. See Abra-
hamsen v. Board of Review of Industrial Com-
mission, Utah ,283 P. 2d 213. The law 
granting a charter to nonprofit clubs imposes 
upon all of them the duties commensurate with 
the rights conferred and provides that the use 
of the premises for the violation of law or for 
profit-making will result in the revocation of the 
~harter." 
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Plaintiffs argue against the statute herein on the 
theory that it is discriminatory, and that those which 
are accorded the privileges granted by the Legislature 
must comply with certain statutory prerequisites. Plain-
tiffs complain that the law is discriminatory because it 
requires qualifications that not all may be able to pro-
duce. The defendant contends that the operation of this 
act is uniform against all whom it endeavors to control 
and bless. The defendant contends and urges most 
strenuously that no party can successfully attack the 
constitutionality of a statute in the absence of a showing 
that the said statute actually harms the plaintiff. 
This Court in Utah Manufacturers Association v. 
Stewart, supra, covered the importance of necessity to 
show injury when attacking the constitutionality of a 
statute, by saying: 
"Plaintiff contends the law is unreasonable 
and discriminatory. If this were true, we do not 
see how plaintiff can lawfully complain, since 
there is no discrimination against it or other 
manufacturers who use alcohol, since all are sub-
ject to the same regulations." 
Clubs and associations of a similar nature are 
treated the same by House Bill 16. The bond is the 
same for the wealthy and the poor clubs. There is no 
privilege extended to the wealthy club that is not also 
extended to the poor club. The principle is not unlike 
the statutory provision requiring that bonds be pur-
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chased by all used car brokers and salesmen; the cost 
is the same, despite the wealth possessed by the appli-
cant; the privilege granted to each is the same. 
This Court in the case of Utah Manufacturers Assoc. 
v. Stewart, supra, carefully sets forth the answer to each 
of the contentions 8et forth by plaintiff, and could be 
properly quoted extensively. However, defendant refers 
the case to the Court as representing a careful analysis 
of the extent to which the State may limit or benefit 
with regard to sale of intoxicating liquors in the State 
of Utah. 
Along the same line another more recent Utah case 
affirms the principle that the state and its subdivisions 
have a peculiar status with respect to the "due process," 
"equal protection of the laws," and other similar con-
stitutional guarantees when the subject matter under 
consideration is the privilege to sell or serve liquor or 
other alcoholic beverage. \Ve refer to Shaw v. Orem 
City (1950), 117 Utah 288, 214 P. 2d 888. The ordinance 
in question prohibited the retail sale of light beer on 
Sunday in Orem. It was stipulated that other businesses 
including retail stores operated on Sunday. The Court 
summarily dismissed the contentions of plaintiff that the 
ordinance violated the right of plaintiff to acquire, 
possess and protect property (Art. I, Sees. 1 and 2, Utah 
Constitution), that it violated the constitutional provi-
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sion that all laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation, (Art. I, Sec. 7, Utah Const.), that it violated 
the "due process" clause, (Art. I, Sec. 7, Ftah Const.), 
and that it was contrary to the due process clause anrl 
the equal protection clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
An1endments to the Constitution of the United States. 
The language of the Court dismissing these constitutional 
arguments was brief and to the point. At page 891 the 
Court states: 
"That the state may prohibit the sale of in-
toxicating liquors, is too well settled to require 
citation of authority. It may delegate such powers 
to cities. State v. Briggs 46 Utah 288, 146 P. 261. 
Since a light beer may be dealt with by the pro-
per legislative authority in so far as regulation 
or prohibition of its sale is concerned, as are 
other alcoholic drinks, Riggins, et al. v. District 
Court, supra, the authority of the legislature to 
enact Sec. 46-0-131 is not open to question." 
POINT IV 
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT INVALID UNDER THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT, SECTION 1, OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES, SINCE IT IS NOT UN-
CERTAIN, AMBIGUOUS OR INCAPABLE OF ENFORCE-
MENT. 
The legislation attacked in this cause of· action places 
upon those who would seek to obtain the privileges 
granted to nonprofit corporations by the State of Utah 
the responsibility to comply with certain standards of 
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conduct whieh they themselves are asked to prepare. 
As an example, th~se privilege seekers are required to 
place some limitation upon the number of members 
which participate in a social club and the statute states 
that the number of members shall be consistent with the 
nature and purpose of the association. In other words, 
without some limitation upon the number of members, the 
association or club could not reasonably be classified as 
a social or recreational club or association, and as a 
consequence the public in general would be admitted to 
the social affairs of the so-called nonprofit corporation, 
which the Legislature feels would be contrary to the 
best interest of the State of Utah. As a consequence, 
the Legislature requires these privilege seekers to es-
tablish some limitation upon the number of members 
which they will permit to join their particular nonprofit 
club or association. Further, the Legislature also re-
quires that these privilege seekers establish in their by-
laws a reasonable initiation fee and dues which are 
consistent with the nature and purpose of the club or 
association. The Legislature had in mind that by doing 
so the public in general would be excluded from the 
premises, and the nonprofit corporation would sustain 
itself through its membership rather than through the 
public in general. H.B. 16 also requires that these privi-
lege seekers establish reasonable regulations for the 
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dropping of me1nbers for the non-payment of dues or 
for other causes and establish strict regulations for the 
government of the association for club rooms and quar-
ters generally consistent with the nature and character 
of the association or club. 
The result of the failure of petitioners for a non-
profit charter to determine what is reasonable with re-
lation to the above referred to requirements is that until 
they have established "reasonable" and "strict" rules 
and regulations covering the specified subjects set forth 
by the Legislature, the Secretary of State is not re-
quired to issue a charter by which the said individuals 
can obtain the desired privileges. The Legislature was 
concerned with two problems when it adopted this sta-
_tute; (1) the welfare of the public, and (2) the safe con-
veying of privileges (i.e., liquor locker system and a malt 
stamp) to nonprofit corporations which fall within cer-
tain, specified categories. It would seem that to suc-
cessfully maintain that the Legislature had established 
an ambiguous and uncertain statute because it requires 
of these privilege seekers reasonable regulations with 
respect to their club or association, would be to go 
beyond a consideration of the welfare of the community. 
The case of E:r party Daniels, 183 Calif. 636, 192 
P. -t-t2, 21 A.L.R. 1172, holds that a statute prohibiting 
''unreasonable" speed in the use of vehicles on the high-
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way is not void for indefiniteness. It would appear that 
the Daniels case represents a very strong aversion on 
the part of the court to holding a statute unconstitutional 
which uses the word ''unreasonable," Despite the fact 
that under that statute anyone who was found to be 
exceeding an "unreasonable" speed was subject to a 
criminal penalty. On the contrary, in the case before 
the Court the only p~nalty for a failure of these privilege 
seekers to establish "reasonable" rules and regulations 
is that they must revise or restate their rules and regula-
tions in such a way as to make them appear reasonable 
and consistent with the purpose of which they desire 
to be established. 
The plaintiffs refer to the Utah case of State v. 
Musser, et al., 223 P. 2d 193, in which the Court held 
that where a criminal penalty obtains upo_n two or more 
persons who "conspire to commit any act injurious to 
public morals," such provision is uncertain due to the 
fact that the view of the public in general as to what 
constitutes an injury to public morals varies from time 
to time and from person to person. In the Musser case, 
a criminal penalty obtains if a member of the public 
fails to interpret what constitutes an injury to the pub-
lic morals. Obviously, to place such a burden upon the 
public would be unconstitutional in view of the uncer-
tainty of defining what is an injury to the public morals. 
If the Legislature had required those desiring a non-
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profit corporation eharter for a club or recreational 
association, etc., to establish reasonable initiation fees, 
reasonable regulations for the dropping of members 
without reference to any criterion upon which the word 
"reasonable" was dependent, perhaps the criticism that 
the Secretary of State could arbitrarily accept or refuse 
the rules and regulations of a nonprofit corporation as 
being unreasonable would constitute such an uncertainty 
that the statute n1ight be classified as unconstitutional. 
However, the Legislature states that the reasonable in-
itiation fee must be consistent with the nature and pur-
pose of the association, which provision limits the Sec-
retary of State with regard to being arbitrary in deter-
mining what is resonable or unreasonable. 
A similar accusation of uncertainty with respect to 
statutes which is lwre made by plaintiffs might be di-
rected against any number of existing statutes presently 
serving the public of this state. As an example, 16-2-5, 
U.C.A. 1953, r~quires that incorporators of corpora-
tions for . pecuniary profit, an1ong other things, enter 
into an agreement in writing setting forth : "the pursuit 
or business agreed upon, specifying it in general terms." 
The word "general" would appear in terms of the argu-
ments of plaintiffs to be uncertain in the extreme, though 
in reality the term is a necessary guide to those parties 
inrorporating under the laws of Utah. 
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The 1949 case determined by the United States 
Supreme Court, known as American Communications 
Assn., 0.1.0. et al., v. Douds, Regional Director of the 
National Labor Relations Board, 339 U.S. 382, at page 
412, discussed the problem of vagueness and uncertainty 
of the statute. The case involved the constitutionality of 
the federal statute 1 equiring officers of labor unions to 
file "non-communist" affidavits. The statute was at-
tacked for vagueness. Chief Justice Vinson set forth a 
test for determining vagueness in the following terms: 
"The argument as to vagueness stresses the 
breadth of such terms as 'affiliated' 'supports' 
and 'illegal or unconstitutional methods.' There 
is little doubt that imagination can conjure up 
hypothetical cases in which the meaning of these 
terms will be in nice question. The applicable 
standard, however, is not one of wholly consistent 
academic definition of abstract terms. It is, 
rather, the practical criterion of fair notice of 
those to whom the statute is directed. The par-
ticular context is all important." 
In the case of Peterson v. Sundt et ux, 67 Ariz. 312, 
195 P. 2d 158, beginning at page 162, in which the court 
was required to determine whether a statute covering re-
funds of over $1,000.00 was uncertain and thus void, 
the court stated as follows : 
"A statute will not be declared void for 
vagueness and uncertainty where the meaning 
thereof may be implied, or where it employs 
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words in common use, or words commonly under-
stood, or words previously judicially defined, or 
having settled meaning in law, or a te(·hnical or 
other special meaning well enough known to en-
able persons within the reach of the statute to 
apply them correctly, or an unmistakable signi-
ficance in the connection in which they are em-
ployed. In short, legislation othrrwise valid will 
not be judicially declared null and void on the 
ground that the same is unintelligible and mean-
ingless unless it is so imperfect and so deficient in 
its details as to render it hnpossible of e.recution 
and enforcement, and is susceptible of no respons-
ible construction that will suz1port and give it 
effect, and the court finds itself unable to define 
the purpose and intent of the legislature." 
In 1951 the case of Clark v. Pasadena, et al., 227 P. 
2d 306, where an· interpretation of charter amendments 
of the City of Pasadena was at issue, being attacked 
as vague and uncertain, the California court stated, 
inter alia, as follows: 
"That there were difficulties in setting up 
such a formula is manifest, but if a practieable 
interpretation of the charter amendments can be 
found the court must adopt it and sustain the 
enactment. A statute wHl not be stricken down 
for uncertaintv if a reasonable and usable con-
struction can be given to its language and it will 
not be rendered nugatory by the fact that there 
may be difficulty in ascertainjng its meaning or 
by the possibility· of different interpretations. 
County of Tulare v. City of Dinuba, 188 Cal. 664, 
(177 -678, 206 p. 983 ... 
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"A statute is not necessarily void because it 
is vague, indefinite, or uncertain • • • or because 
the intention of the legislature might have been 
expressed in plainer terms, * • • and opinions 
may differ in respect of what falls within its 
terms * • * . A statute will not be declared void 
for vagueness and uncertainty where the mean-
ing thereof may be implied, • • * ." 50 Am. Jur., 
PP. 489, "Statutes," sec. 473. 
POINT V 
HOUSE BILL 16 IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER AR-
TICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH AND IS NOT AN INVALID DELEGATION OF A 
JUDICIAL FUNCTION. 
Plaintiffs claim that the Secretary of State is in-
capable of determining whether the privilege seeking 
corporation is in compliance with the requirements of 
law set down by the giver of the privilege. Plaintiffs 
state that Article VII, Section 16, of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah, and Section 67-2-2, U.C.A. 1953, 
limits the duties of the Secretary of State to ministerial 
duties solely, and therefore he is not empowered, nor 
can he be, to determine in his discretion whether a cor-
poration covered by the provisions of House Bill 16 is 
in compliance with the law; and, if determined not to 
be so, to cancel the charter of the nonprofit corporation. 
Article VII, Section 16, of the Utah Constitution 
reads: 
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"The Secretary shall keep a record of the 
official acts of the Legislature and executive de-
partment of the state, and, when required shall 
lay the same and all matters relative thereto 
before either branch of the legislature, and s·hall 
perform such other duties as may be provided 
by .law:" (En1phasis added.) 
The Legislature under this provision of the Con-
stitution may determine the duties that are to be per-
formed by the Secretary of State, and are not prohibited 
from assigning administrative or quasi-judicial duties 
to the said officer. Duties of the Secretary of State 
heretofore determined by the Legislature, which may 
appear to plaintiffs to be solely ministerial, do not magic-
ally prohibit the creation of new duties which are of a 
different nature. The Supreme Court of Montana in the 
case of Barnett Iron Works, Inc., v. Harmon, Secretary 
of State, 285 P. 191, after first holding that corporations 
"are creatures of the law and come into being only upon 
substantial compliance with the statute," went on to state 
that: 
"While the Secretary of State, in the per-
formance of many of his official functions, is a 
mere ministerial officer, yet he is clothed with 
quasi-judicial judgment in the organization of 
corporations nnder the laws of the state." 
The Legislature under the Constitution of Utah 
is capable of requiring the Secretary of State to per-
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form such duties as it shall from time to time consider 
necessary. 
In State v. Stark, 52 P. 2d 890,the Supreme Court 
of Montana in questioning the right of the Legislature 
to delegate authority, stated: 
"Delegation of power to determine who are 
within the operation of the law is not a delega-
tion of legislative power. State v. Thompson, 160 
Mo. 333, 60 S. W. 1077, 54 L.R.A. 950, 83 Am. 
St. Rep. 468. Delegation of power to incorporated 
medical societies to appoint medical examiners 
to examine and pass upon the fitness of appli- · 
cants to practice medicine is not invalid. Scholle 
v. State, 90 Md. 729, 46 A. 326, 50 L.R.A. 411. 
But it is essential that the Legislature shall fix 
some standard by which the officer or board to 
whom the power is delegated may be governed, 
and not left to be controlled by caprice. Harmon 
v. State, 66 Ohio St. 249, 64 N.E. 117, 53 L.R.A. 
618. 'The Legislature cannot delegate its power 
to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate 
a power to determine some fact or state of things 
upon which the law makes, or intends to make, 
its own action depend. To deny this would be to 
stop the wheels of government.' Field v. Clark, 
143 U.S. 649, 694, 12 S. Ct. 495, 505, 36 L. Ed. 
294; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 31 
S. Ct. 480, 55 L. Ed. 563." 
The case of Entre N ous Club, a Utah corporation, 
v. Lamont F. Toronto, Secretary of State, supra, dis-
cusses the constitutionality of 16-6-13, U.C.A. 1953, 
with respect to the conferring of judicial power upon 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
the Secretary of State, and the Court in that case, hold-
ing that the statute was constitutional, stated a~ follows: 
"The constitutionality of U.C.A. 1953, 16-6-13, 
was tested in the case of Citizen's Club v. Welling, 
83 Utah 81, 27 P. 2d 23, a unanimous court hold-
ing that the statute was not unconstitutional ns 
conferring judicial power upon the Secretary of 
State. This was not a trial for crilnes committed 
by the club or its agents, but merely the enforC'f'-
ment of statutory civil consequences of the viola-
tion of duties under the club charter." 
The case of Cifi.zen' s Club v. Welling, 83 Utah 81, 
27 P. 2d 23, nicely p0inted out the illogic of arguing that 
the Legislature had wrongfully delegated a judicial func-
tion, by use of the following language: 
"To hold that the act here in question is in-
valid because conferring judicial power upon the 
Secretary of State in violation of the constitu-
tional provisions, requires a holding that the acts 
of the Legislature conferring power and discre-
tion upon the various hoards and commisRions 
referred to, likewise are invalid because conferr-
ing judicial power upon them in violation of the 
Constitution. The contrary has been held by this 
court and so are the authorities generally." 
POINT VI 
HOUSE BILL 16 DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 18, UTAH CONSTUTION, IN THAT IT DOES NOT 
IMPAIR THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. 
Plaintiffs raise the further objection to House Bill 
16 in that "it impairs the obligation of contracts both 
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now existing and fl,ture." This argument is fully dis-
posed of by the ruling of this Court in the case of 
Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 
183, 51 P. 2d 645. In that case, plaintiffs had beer 
licenses when the Legislature enacted a new law, which 
in effect cancelled the existing licenses. We quote this 
Court's discussion on this problem as follows: 
"It is next contended on behalf of plaintiffs 
that their licenses, issued under the law of 1933, 
are valid notwithstanding the enactment of the 
Liquor Control Act of 1935. The textwriters and 
adjudicated cases generally do not support but 
are against that contention. 
'A license to sell liquor is revoked or an-
nulled by the repeal of the law authorizing the 
grant of such licenses, or by any change in the 
legislation of the state or district inconsistent 
with the further exercise of the right conferred 
by the license, such as the adoption of a prohibi-
tory statute or a local option law: 33 C.J. 565. 
To the same effect is the text in 33 C.J. 622 
and 37 C.J. 246. In 17 R.C.L. p. 476, it is said: 
Following the general principle that a license is 
not a contract, it is clear that it does not in itself 
create any vested right, or permanent right, and 
that free latitude is reserved by the legislature 
to impose new or additional burdens on the licen-
see, or to alter the license, or to revoke or annul 
it. And this is the general rule notwithstanding 
the expenditure of money by the licensee in re-
liance thereon, and regardless of whether the term 
for which the lirensP was given has expired.' 
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Cases which support the foregoing texts will 
be found collected in footnotes thereto. Even 
though licenses should be held to be entitled to 
the same standing in law as contracts, which they 
are not, still it was competent for the Legislature 
under its police power to nulHfy the lirenses 
theretofore issued. We quote from 1 Cooley's 
Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) at page 36: 
'Equally incumbent upon the State legislature 
and these municipal bodies is the restriction that 
they shall adopt no irrepealable legislation. No 
legislative body ran so part with its powerR by 
any proceeding as not to be able to continue the 
exercise of th~m. It can and should exercise them 
again and again, as often as the public interests 
require. Such a body has no power, even by Con-
tract, to control and embarrass its legislative 
power and duties." 
"Quoting further from the same volume at 
page 579 it is said: 'It would seem, therefore, 
to be the prevailing opinion, and one based upon 
sound reason, that the State cannot barter away, 
or in any manner abridge or weaken, any of those 
essential powers which are inherent in all govern-
ments, and the existence of which in full vigor 
is important to the well-being of organized soci-
ety; and that any contracts to that end are void 
upon general principles, and cannot be saved from 
invalidity by the provision of the national Con-
stitution. • • • ' 
This court in a number of cases has held that 
a contract although valid when made must give 
way to ·the proper exercise of the police powers 
of the lawn1aking body. Among the cases so hold-
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ing are: City of St. George v. Public Utilities 
Commission, 62 Utah 453, 220 P. 720, and Retan 
v. Salt Lake City, 63 Utah 459, 226 P. 1095." 
Plaintiffs are denied the right to farm out the sale 
of food and beverages by contract, only if they choose 
voluntarily on their own part to maintain premises upon 
which liquor is or will be sold or stored. As this Court 
said in the language just quoted from the Riggins case, 
"a contract although valid when made must give way to 
the proper exercise of the police powers of the law mak-
ing body." See also Advertiser Co. v. State, 69 So. 501 
(Ala. 1915), particularly at 503. 
POINT VII 
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT CONTRARY TO ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 9, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, IN THAT IT DOES 
NOT PROVIDE FOR AN EX.CESSIVE AND UNREASON-
ABLE FINE UPON A LIMITED GROUP. 
As has been stated, the State of Utah will confer 
a privilege upon those who wish to take upon them-
selves the precedent conditions determined by the State. 
The State has jealously guarded the privilege bestowed 
by House Bill 16 and has stated to all those that might 
seek after the privilege, that if they misuse it they shall 
be bound unto the State of the sum of $5,000.00. Since 
the State of Utah has exclusive control over the privilege, 
cases supra, they may require any conditions they choose 
4lt those who seek to l' btain the said privilege. 
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The plaintiffs have said that the $5,000.00 bond 
represents an excessive fine. In fact, the bond is in tl1r 
form of a penal bond to which the nonprofit corporation 
is bound. The case of Fresh Grown Preserves Corpora-
tion et al., v. United States, 144 F. 2nd 136, at page 139, 
which discusses the forfeiture of penal bonds, states as 
follows: 
"The authorities are clear that where a bond 
is given to a public body as a condition on a 
compliance with law, the full penalty of such bond 
may be recovered for a breach thereof, in the 
absence of statutory provision to the contrary. 
Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 2 S. Ct. 878, 27 
L. Ed. 780; United States v. Dieckerhoff 202 U.S. 
302, 26 S. Ct. 604, 50 L. Ed. 1041 Eagle Indemnity 
Co. v. United States, Supra." 
House Bill 16 affirmatively requires a forfeiture of 
the sum of the bond. In the Preserves case, supra, the 
court upheld the automatic forfeiture of a penal bond. 
The court quoted from the Dieckerhoff case by using the 
following language: 
"But we think the purpose of the statute and 
the purpose of the requirement in the bond pro-
vided for therein, and the one given in this case, 
was to secure the performance of the duty im-
posed of returning the package or packages, 
where an importer availed himself of the privilege 
of withdrawing merchandise from the custody 
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of the government officials before it has been 
examined and appraised. • • • We think such 
undertaking, for this manner of discharging this 
duty, or praying the value stipulated, was in-
tended to and does relieve the government from 
the necessity of showing any actual damage or 
loss." (Emphasis added). 
This Court in the Entre N ous case, supra, has al-
ready stated that revoking the charter of the club is 
reasonable and that a club is a proper subject for regula-
tion, and it is the corporation that is being penalized 
by the revoking and not the members, thereof. The bond 
required by House Bill 16 also runs from the club to the 
State of Utah, and is a condition to receiving the priv-
ilege. The Legislature has determined the sum of 
$5,000.00 to be reasonable damage to the State upon 
misuse of the granted privilege by the club. 
CONCLUSION 
House Bill16 is a statute which permits the bestowal 
of the liquor locker privilege and the federal malt stamp 
privilege upon nonprofit corporations. 
The State of Utah, realizing the temptations exist-
ing coincident with the possession of such a privilege 
(i.e., the desire to invite the public so that the coffers 
will be full; the temptation to use the nonprofit cor-
poration for the sole purpose of obtaining the privilege, 
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while contracting the privilege, the concessions, Pte., to 
profit-making groups; the keeping of two sets of books; 
the attraction of liquor and then establishing gambling, 
or permitting it etc.) has carefully provided a set of con-
ditions which are designed to protect the health and wel-
fare of the community while permitting the privilege. 
Since the right to control and regulate liquor is 
possessed exclusively by the State, under the police 
power, this Honorable Court should sustain House Bill 
16 as a proper regulation by the State of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
DONN E. CASSITY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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